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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a divorce decree rendered by the 
Honorable Phillip R. Fishier of the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County. Utah Code Annotated 1953 section 
78-2a-3(2)(g) provides that the Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction over domestic relations cases. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Four issues are presented for review, although 
plaintiff's Brief separates the issues into nine points. The 
issues are: 
1. Did the Court abuse its discretion in awarding 
custody of the children to the defendant? 
2. Did the Court abuse its discretion in its child sup-
port award in light of plaintiff's substantial income? 
3. Did the Court abuse its discretion in valuing and 
dividing the assets of the parties? 
4. Is the plaintiff entitled to attorney's fees in 
bringing this appeal? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS! 
The interpretation of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
Rule 15, U.C.A. §30-3-5(3) and §78-45-7(2) are relevant to this 
appeal. The rule and statutes are set forth in Addendum 1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of a divorce decree. Plaintiff, Eddie 
Ebbert, sued defendant, Barbara Ebbert, for divorce on the grounds 
1 
of mental cruelty. His complaint alleged that the defendant 
should have custody of the parties' two daughters with specific 
visitation rights to the plaintiff, and that the defendant should 
receive certain marital property. 
Long before trial the defendant informed the plaintiff 
that she intended to move to Colorado. During trial the plain-
tiff apparently decided he wanted custody of the children and 
accused the defendant of child abuse. The court upon hearing 
plaintiff's testimony offered to stop the trial and order a 
custody evaluation. Plaintiff decided to retract his statements, 
withdrawing custody as a contested issue. Both parties received 
a portion of the marital assets and debts; plaintiff was ordered 
to pay child support and to pay nominal alimony. Each party was 
ordered to pay his or her own attorney's fees. 
Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on June 10, 
1985. (Record 2-11). Defendant answered and counterclaimed on 
July 22, 1985. (Record 12-17). The parties on November 10, 1985 
stipulated to a settlement of the action including that custody 
of their children was to be with the defendant, wife and mother. 
(Record 315-326). But the parties were thereafter unable to agree 
upon the form of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce, and upon motion of the defendant 
(Record 165-68) the stipulation was set aside (Record 205) and 
trial was held on March 27, 1986. 
2 
At trial both parties appeared, represented by counsel, 
and offered testimony and exhibits. At the close of trial the 
court below ruled on the matter. (Record 328-345). He awarded 
custody of the children to the defendant in accordance with the 
plaintiff's complaint, the defendant's answer and counterclaim 
and the prior stipulation of the parties. (Record 329) . He 
ordered defendant to pay child support of $325 per month per 
child (Record 330); and he awarded alimony of $1,00 per year for 
two years to defendant (Record 3 30) ; he divided the property and 
debts of the parties (Record 329-332) and at the insistence of 
the plaintiff, established a specific visitation schedule (Record 
332-342). The court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and a Judgment and Decree of Divorce on May 15, 1986. 
Defendant moved for a new trial on May 27, 1986 on the 
issues of child support, child custody and property division. 
(Record 276-77). A hearing was held on plaintiff's motion for 
new trial on July 1, 1986 and the court denied the motion the 
same day. (Record 284, 384-364). Thereafter, plaintiff filed a 
notice of appeal. (Record 289-90). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married in June of 1976. (Record 2). 
They are the parents of two daughters ages seven and five. 
(Record 2). Plaintiff works as a manufacturer representative and 
earns approximately $36,500 per year, plus an automobile provided 
by his employer. (Record 587). Defendant worked periodically as 
3 
a bank teller during the marriage and is capable of earning 
approximately $1,300 per month. (Record 408). During the marriage 
the defendant's parents gave the parties many gifts in the form 
of property and cash which greatly improved the financial cir-
cumstances of the family. (Record 389, 414, 442, 457, 470). 
Both parties pleaded that the children should be in the 
custody of their mother, the defendant. (Record 3, 14). When 
the case initially settled plaintiff agreed that the defendant 
should be the custodial parent. (Record 304). After the plain-
tiff filed for divorce (June of 1985) he and the defendant 
discussed the custody and visitation situation in September of 
1985 (Record 578) and the defendant told the plaintiff that she 
was planning to move to Colorado. (Record 578). During the 
trial plaintiff attempted to amend his pleadings and pray for 
custody of the children (Record 620). Defendant's counsel 
objected to that attempt (Record 619) and the trial court denied 
the motion to amend citing concerns over plaintiff's advance 
notice of the issue and his failure to move to amend before 
trial. (Record 621). Later in the trial the plaintiff testified 
that defendant had physically abused the children (Record 624) 
and that he should have custody. The trial court then offered to 
suspend the proceedings and order a custody evaluation. (Record 
625). The plaintiff declined the court's offer and instead 
retracted his statements related to custody issues. (Record 625) . 
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At the close of trial the court awarded permanent 
custod1, f , ( -*'i"i * •"'•••- JAfendar+' with specific visita-
tion rights -. requested . -r.e . _a^ r/--.:. 'Fe^ :-: ; - «\ 
2 41-254). liie ^ r* -1 :- - finding that the defendant *':. a :. 
mother and a f . ^- - - custody - the] 
children." e-.-r^  256-57) ~* :^ 4t ordered plainer: .. pay 
chl 1 d suppor*" -** ' " "" -- month er er : I i arc -cm:-".a I alir.cry 
(one dollar 
The parties were ordered ~ iav neir ~w attorneys' aes. 
(Record 2 64 ) . 
Ihe court tcurid Lh.it U"m iJiitie1 h-:id tuMl insets of 
$103,866.GG and liabilities of $10,175.00 resulting in a net 
won th ''if $9 1,691.00. (Record 259). The net worth of the parties 
included gifts to the parties by the delenda'.i s parents* 
totalling $93,433.00, (Record 259). Plaintiff was awarded the 
re * household furnishings and his vested 
savings p^a. benefit: '°44-46) and he wis ordered Lo discharge 
som*- -r fc*>- '^cr? (Record 246) . Similarly, defendant received 
t - • - I d furnishings and was ordered to 
discharge ^ err :c:. * . debts. (Recoi .: . ". I'M. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT | 
1. "The i/" JIIJIT'S custody award was proper, Both parties 
pled that the defendant should have custody of the '. hildi*". 
The court received evidence that defendant was a fit and proper 
5 
parent. Plaintiff's contentions concerning judicial bias, inade-
quate findings, visitation, amendment of pleadings at trial are 
unsupported by the record—the court did not abuse its discre-
tion. 
2. The trial court's child support award was proper in 
light of the totality of circumstances including the plaintiff's 
and defendant's respective earning capacities. 
3. The court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating 
and dividing the marital estate. The court's property division 
awarded substantial assets and debts to both parties in equitable 
proportions. 
4. This court should not award plaintiff attorney's 
fees in bringing this appeal because his income is sufficient to 
enable him to bear his own expenses for this specious appeal. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The standard of review is an important preliminary con-
sideration for this Court. The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
Our standard of review in divorce pro-
ceedings allows us to disturb the action of the 
trial court only when the evidence clearly 
preponderates to the contrary or the trial court 
has abused its discretion or misapplied princi-
ples of law. Subject to those limitations, we 
are free to review both the facts and the law. 
Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1985) [citations 
omitted]. 
A more recent case held: 
While we may review both the facts and law in 
matters of equity, we also accord considerable 
6 
deference to the judgment of the trial court 
and treat its findings with a presumption of 
validity. 
King v. King, 717 P.2d Tib tUtah n fl h i. 
Apply LL'j those standards to the facts of the case mar-
date affirmance of the decree of the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
7 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN AWARDING CUSTODY OF THE 
CHILDREN TO THE DEFENDANT 
Ihn plaint I'M in Points 1 through VI of his brief 
asserts that child custody was an issue at trial, that the 
court below erred by tp^uqinq il ' -iik'w ylaintitt to amend his 
pleadings <•»" trial, tLdt the trial judge was biased, and that the 
court erred by making insufficient findings as. to custody 
Plaintiff also claims ftM* f !J*J trial louit's isitation schedule 
was L iiequinalle. Plaintiff's arguments are redundant, and this 
Brief will address all ot the custody and visitation issues, in 
this one section. 
A. Plaintiff did not Raise Custody Issues at Trial 
Plaintiff's arguments concerning child ^ * e 
disingenuous and un'-upportPd by the record wv-- - •* plaintiff 
filed tor divorce he specifically pleaded that tr.e defendant 
should have custody of both children. His — • •- •. ; 
Defendant should be awarded the care, custody 
and control of the parties1 minor children 
subject to the defendant's right to liberal 
visitation at minimum as follows,,.. 
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(Record 3). Five months later when the parties appeared at the 
stipulation hearing the plaintiff agreed that defendant should be 
custodial parent. (Record 303). 
Not until trial did the plaintiff attempt to raise 
custody issues, but he later changed his mind and retracted his 
statements related to custody: 
Q. [by Mr. Hanson] Isn't there going to be— 
will that not create a financial burden on you 
to attempt to see them every week? 
A [by Eddie Ebbert] Not if I can have an 
abatement clause for the time they're with me 
and if she will pay the expense to get them 
over here I'm afraid, if I don't see them 
every week, for the kids physical health. 
I've seen bruises on them too many times and 
welts. 
Mr. Cowley: Oh, come on. 
Mrs. Ebbert: Oh, Eddie. 
The Court: I think if that's what he's 
saying, now—now you've done it because I'm 
going to terminate this hearing right now, 
here and now, and I am going to just stop and 
we're going to have—I'm going to order a 
custody evaluation. Now, do you want to 
retract that statement, sir? 
The Witness: Can I speak to him or you 
or somebody? I—I'm not—I'm honest— 
Mr. Hanson: Just listen. 
The Court: Are you telling me that you 
have observed welts and bruises on these 
children while they're in the custody of Mrs. 
Ebbert that would lead you to believe that 
these children are being physically abused? 
The Witness: It was—no that's not, what 
I said and I didn't mean that, that they're 
being physically abused. How do I explain 
this, exactly what's going on? 
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The Court: I think you better—let's 
take a five-minute recess and I think you 
better confer with Mr. Hanson. Because from 
what you're saying, you've now put me—if what 
you're saying is true, then I think that I 
can, on my own motion, make custody an issue 
because I'm not going to allow you two to sti-
pulate to a custody situation which, in my 
mind, would put the children at risk. And 
from what you're saying, I think that's 
exactly it. So let's take a five-minute 
recess and you confer with Mr. Hanson. This 
court will be I n recess for five minutes. 
[Whereupon, a Brief recess was had? after 
which, the following proceedings continued:] 
The Court: RetUrn again to D85-2144. 
You may proceed, Mr. Hanson. 
Mr F fa nson i Th,ank \ ot i youx- nonor . 
Q. (By Mr. Hanson) Mr. Ebbert, you 
just had an opportunity in conference to 
discuss your statement that was made " •:*-
court. 
A, ,*:"-
Q. And upoi 1 r \y ad < r:ii ce do i : i i now retract 
that statement? 
; as. 
Hanson: No further questions, your 
Hon'.- . 
(Record 624-2 5). 
If is apparent from the record that Mi Ebbert sought 
to cnaJJenue Mi b I bbp t f ' :< I itne?s in h >n H I'usfody and that the 
court was willing to stop flie tijal, initiate »i custody eva-
luation n^d '71 ve Mr Ebbert a full hearing on who should have 
custody ot tiie oui i lit»h, Tie ccnr4: :*id; 
if what you're saying is true, then I think 
that 1 can, on my own motion, make custody an 
9 
issue because I'm not going to allow you to 
stipulate to a custody situation which...would 
put the children at risk. 
(Record at 625). 
Following the court's statement, and a recess, the 
plaintiff, on advice of counsel, withdrew the custody issue by 
retracting his statement that attempted to place custody in 
issue. Plaintiff waived trial of the custody issue by pleading 
that the defendant should have custody. 
Plaintiff asserts that custody was in issue because the 
stipulation between the parties was set aside and the case went 
to trial. (Brief p. 15-16). The plaintiff ignores the allegation 
in his complaint that defendant should have custody. He also 
argues that defendant's denial of paragraph 4 of the Complaint 
(pleading custody in the defendant) (Record 12) made custody an 
issue. (Brief p. 11). Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim 
alleged that custody was proper in the defendant. (Record 14). 
Plaintiff also entered into a stipulation etwarding custody of the 
children to the defendant. (Record 303). Therefore, the custody 
issue was resolved by the pleadings and the only issues to be 
tried were visitation rights, child support, alimony and property 
division. In a hearing before trial the court interrogated the 
defendant about her parental fitness. (Record 312). Thus, the 
court had a solid basis for his custody decision even assuming 
for the sake of argument that custody was in issue. 
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The distinction between custody issues and visitation 
issue- - ^nui£f ?s Brief fails to recognize 
the distinction, Visitation rights were clearly in issue inn 
disputed. The trial excerpts, quoted at length in plaintiff's 
B r i e f (pp. 1 i -.-' 4 i , r e\» P -I I f ha 1 \, i s 11 at: i on
 # rather than custody, 
•v . s v-.e f:x::_.; ;)f p^:;::::ifs arguments before the t.io'ii1', Ir r- J 
Plaintiff- -~tcrne*- stated that ..s questions concerning the 
move . . . - . children were intended to 
lay *. record regarding foundat . .. concerning visit; at urn 
(Record 569} • * ~je - '"H shows that • e parties and the court 
at the incii?- - ex pen mil .tnmh of the* trial. 
establishing an extremely specific visitation schedule, a .i !,t 
di i} e premised -~ -~- defendant serving as custodial parent. 
(Record 332-J*- ,'J-84) 
Because tr.e plaintiff pleaded that custody should re in 
the iefendar it he is bound by the admissions of hi s pleadings. 
Numerous cases have hel d that par t i es ar • = b o u n d h/ >-i sser 11 o n s 
made In pleadings: 
Normally factual assertions in pleadings and 
pretrial orders are considered to be judicial 
admissions conclusively binding on the party 
who made them. 
White v. Anco/Polymers, Inc., 7*u K-hi I o] i rie i rn i ii 
198: ; see also, Thomasset v. Thomasset „e^ ^z > . , 
A-. -* proceeding ^a^ <~ admission of 
facts asserted therein). ..
 r. ... - : 
dant was the proper custodial parent. 
LI 
Plaintiff should not be allowed to open the custody 
issue on appeal when he failed to timely and properly raise the 
issue before trial. Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090, 
1092 (Utah 1978); Burnham v. Burnham, 7161 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 
1986). The plaintiff declined the court's invitation to stop the 
trial and evaluate the custody issue and plaintiff cannot now be 
heard to complain on appeal about issues he intentionally omitted. 
B. Amendment of Pleadings 
Error is also claimed because the court below did not 
allow the plaintiff to amend his Complaint and plead for custody 
of the children. (Brief p. 18-2 0). Plaintiff contends that the 
trial court failed to follow Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
("U.R.C.P.") Rule 15. Conveniently omitted from plaintiff's 
Brief are Utah cases on point. 
The standard of appellate review regarding U.R.C.P. 15 
is whether the court abused its discretion in refusing to allow 
amendment of pleadings during trial. Westley v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983); Stratford v. Morgan, 689 
P.2d 360, 365 (Utah 1984). In Stratford, supra, the supreme 
court upheld the trial court's decision not to allow amendment of 
pleadings where the plaintiffs had intentionally omitted an issue 
from prior pleadings and had represented to the court before 
trial that the issue would not be litigated. 689 P.2d at 3 65. 
Similarly in Westley, supra, the supreme court stated: 
Although Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure tends to favor the granting of leave 
12 
to amena, trie matter remains w i t n m the souna 
discretion of the trail court...An amendment 
would certainly have delayed the trial and the 
substance of plaintiff's new allegation was 
known a full year earlier when plaintiff 
discussed 1+" in his deposition. 
^ 3 I" , ?;i a t r-4 
Here, plaintiff admits that he discussed custody issues, 
including defendant's plai:re I IT-1"- K,-. Colorado, long before trial. 
(Brief" p II, Record at 578j. Defendan1 " * planned move to Colorado 
'is apparent,;1,.;; why plaintiff decided he would be the better custo-
dial parent (Record 82 i t -• < , I'-he plaintiff waited until 
trial '" . rn^'e *o amend his pleading and pt^/ tcr custody of the 
children, he v. . J; . The trial court did not abuse Hey 
discretion in refusing to a r M t plaintiff's motion to amend, 
C. Judicial Bias Concerning Custody J 
Plaintiff1-: submission of an affidavit by Kenn M. 
Hanson, his attorney at trial, dlleqin'f the trial court's bias 
concern in«i custody issues is both inaccurate ai id i mproper. 
(Brief, Addendum , I'lainti'f's counsel states in part; 
11. That there were times throughout the 
trial when the Court's gestures were not 
reflected on the record, but which gestures 
where (sirv indicative of the Court's attitude 
and bias, J 
12. That in one such demonstration the 
Court•s gestures were so poignant as to coerce 
the Appelant to withdraw testimony regarding 
the children's physical health and to bring 
the trial to a premature end.... 
14. That during the course of this 
discussion the Court gestured in a dramatic, 
overbearing and intimidating fashion, 
. 3 
whereupon the Court came right out of the 
bench, extending his arm and pointing his 
finger at the Appellant• 
(Brief, Addendum 1 p.3.). 
Mr. Hanson's allegation that the court below made 
gestures that were "so poignant as to coerce the Appellant to 
withdraw testimony" is irresponsible. It implies that the plain-
tiff was unrepresented by legal counsel at trial, and that plain-
tiff had no alternative, given the intimidating gestures of the 
judge, other than retracting his statement concerning the health 
safety of the children. In fact, the record shows that Mr. 
Hanson consulted with the plaintiff in private prior to plain-
tiff's retraction of his statements about child abuse. (Record 
625). To accuse the court below of coercing a retraction from 
the plaintiff of his statement concerning child abuse improperly 
maligns the integrity of the court and fails to explain why trial 
counsel did not preserve the issue for appellate review. Absent 
from the record is an objection by the plaintiff concerning judi-
cial bias or a preservation of the "coercion" issue pursuant to 
U.R.C.P. 63(b). Thus, plaintiff's arguments regarding bias of 
the trial judge and plaintiff's "involuntary" retraction of the 
custody issue are not properly reviewable because plaintiff 
failed to object, or to move for new trial because of judicial 
bias. (Record 266-72). Meir v. Christensen, 389 P.2d 734 (Utah 
1964) (comments by judge must be objected to in order to be 
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reviewed on appeal ); Brannan v, siemp 4 9 p <M '-r^  "'8/1 • 
1971) (prejudicial mannerisms by trial court must be objected to 
i
 : i,» eser v o 1*1 P1 e 1 1 at P T e v i e w ) . H e n r i k s e n v. L y o n s f 6 5 2 P, 2d 19, 
. (Wash.App, 1982) (where bias exists request for r^ersal L"i a 
prerequisite • appeal) . Defendant s itr.orney could submit an 
• tffidt 'ison-s statements. However, this 
Court does not have t .- ;^r:sa:c^i^ n r +-he machi ner \ to r ecei /e 
evidence an; determine whic^ iffiant - correct. Accordingly, 
lefei v - - a meaningless affida-
vit. A careful review of the entire record absolutely refutes 
Mr. Hanson's improper allegation of bi as. 
D. Findings of Fact Respecting Custody1 
Plaintiff claims that the court's Findings ct F3'.* M" 
with respec* --* child custody was inadequate (Brief p. 7-8) 
l--.ai.nt lit I l'i*- Ji l 1 M )»:j l *••'i ' ni \ *:i n ini i-'OTnni a i ns a b o u c o y 
pleading that defendant should have custody, ; . waiting until 
trial to attempt ~ - amend his pleadings and ::• declining ~ne. 
court' s i n v i L a I -1 vamp 1 et f-1  .:i - • •; - - - ~ ~ -on. 
Plaintiff retracted his criticisms of defendant, s parent: -cr 
skills (Record 625), and the record as a whole indicates that 
d e f e n d a n t is «/S yo o n mother ^nn i i I- t-n hp fhp «'ijst-od i. ^ I p a r e n t . 
(Record 312), The Utah Supreme Court has held: 
In appropriate cases—where the findings are 
terse but still suggest the weight accorded to 
the testimony of the witnesses by the trial 
court, and outline the basis of the custody 
award—we can find that there was competent 
evidence to support the judgment so long as it 
is not fso flagrantly unjust as to constitute 
an abuse of discretion.' 
Pennington v. Pennington, 711 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah 1985) 
[citations omitted]. 
Here, the award was anything but a flagrantly unjust. 
Rather, it conformed to plaintiff's own allegations. The 
plaintiff's complaint combined with the presumptive validity of 
the Court's findings, King v. King, 717 P.2d 715 (Utah 1986) man-
dates affirmance of the custody award on appeal. 
Plaintiff cites two Utah cases, Martinez v. Martinez, 
728 P.2d 994 (Utah 1986) and Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 
1986) for the proposition that a trial court must make specific 
findings regarding custody—at least more detailed than rendered 
by the court below. Plaintiff misconceives the holdings of 
Martinez and Smith, supra. In both those cases custody was 
hotly contested at trial (Smith was a custody modification case) 
and extensive evidence received about the parental fitness of 
each party. The cases teach that detailed findings are reguired 
when custody is disputed at trial. Here, both parties agreed 
that defendant should have custody of the children, and any con-
cerns plaintiff has with the court's findings on custody are 
self-inflicted. The Findings of Fact are amply supported by the 
evidence and are more than adeguate to support the Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce. The court received evidence on the parental 
fitness of both parties, and relied on the pleadings in making 
his decision. (Record 312, 523, 623). 
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E. Visitation Rights 
Finally, plaintiff claims that the visitation schedule 
decreed by the district court was error, and that the defendant 
has "verbally declined the Appellant visitation rights on four-
teen occasions." (Brief p. 33). An affidavit by the plaintiff 
appears as Addendum 2 of the plaintiff's Brief alleging that the 
defendant has not complied with the visitation rights defined by 
the decree. 
First, the award of visitation rights is within the 
trial court's discretion and should be reversed only for abuse of 
that discretion. Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Utah 
1980). Here, at the insistence of the plaintiff, the court 
established a very specific visitation arrangement. (Record 
332-342, 372-384, 570-72). Exhibit A to the Judgment and Decree 
of Divorce (Record 250-54) sets forth plaintiff's visitation 
schedule and shows that the trial court rendered a judgment that 
was fair to both parties and their children. Plaintiff has visi-
tation rights including alternating legal holidays, rotating 
Christmas and Thanksgiving holidays, and for three weeks during 
the summer. Plaintiff complains about the difficulties with 
exercising his visitation rights because the children live in 
Colorado (Brief p. 34), but he fails to explain how the trial 
court could have more practically and equitably remedied the 
problem. Given the circumstances, including the ages of the 
children, the visitation schedule is equitable and should be 
upheld. 
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Second, plaintiff's affidavit regarding the enforcement 
of the terms of the decree is not properly before this Court. 
The Court of Appeals does not have the means of adequately 
testing the truth of affidavits by examination and cross-
examination of witnesses. Defendant therefore declines to submit 
an affidavit to this Court responding to plaintiff's affidavit. 
However, less the Court accept the truth of plaintiff's affida-
vit, defendant hereby represents that she has never denied the 
plaintiff child visitation as provided by the decree. To the 
contrary, plaintiff has failed to take advantage of his alloted 
visitation rights. Until a district court has made a factual 
determination concerning plaintiff's allegations, this Court 
should decline to review plaintiff's affidavit. Plaintiff's 
remedy is a contempt proceeding before the district court. One 
Utah case touches upon the subject of enforcement of divorce 
decrees during appeal and implies that the continuing jurisdic-
tion of district courts pursuant to U.C.A. 30-3-5(3) provides the 
trial court with enforcement powers even while the proceeding is 
on appeal. Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 645 footnote 3 (Utah 
1980); see also, Enyart v. Comfort, 591 P.2d 709 (Okla. 1979) 
(trial court maintains enforcement jurisdiction during divorce 
appeal). U.R.C.P. 60(a) allows for immediate enforcement of 
judgments unless a bond is filed, and the district courts are 
better equipped to enforce their decrees than the appellate 
courts. 
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Finally, plaintiff's contentions that the trial court 
should have ordered defendant to remain in Utah are without 
merit. (Brief p. 28-32). Plaintiff is capable of traveling to 
Colorado, and the defendant's right to travel should not be 
impinged. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (U.S. 1968). Utah 
authority supports the defendant's right to live where she 
desires with the children. Earl v. Earl, 406 P.2d 302 (Utah 1965). 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CHILD SUPPORT 
AWARD WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
Contrary to plaintiff's arguments, (Brief p. 34-41) the 
$325 per month per child awarded by the trial court was proper. 
The trial court carefully considered the overall situation in 
setting the support obligations. The court weighed the plain-
tiff's earning ability, the defendant's earning ability, and the 
expenses of both parties. (Record 420, 494, 524, 590). The 
appellant bears the burden of proving that the trial court abused 
its discretion in setting the amount of child support, McCarty v. 
McCarty, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1979); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 
527 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Utah 1974), and plaintiff has failed to meet 
that burden here. 
Plaintiff's arguments fail to disclose any abuse of 
discretion by the trial court, in fact, the record shows that the 
court made reasonable provisions for child support. The evidence 
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at trial showed that the plaintiff is a manufacturer represen-
tative with net after tax earnings of $24,000 per year (including 
the leasehold value of company car furnished to the plaintiff). 
(Record 330, 422, 586-597). The defendant was found to be 
capable of earning $700 per month after taxes as a bank teller. 
(Record 330, 485-490). 
Plaintiff cites Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7(2) 
contending that the trial court failed to consider the factors 
outlined by statute in setting the support amount. (Brief p. 
34-35). The record demonstrates that the trial court received 
evidence on each of the factors listed in U.C.A. 78-45-7(2). 
Plaintiff's Brief, not the trial court, fails to adequately con-
sider and comprehend U.C.A. Section 78-45-7(2). 
Much of the record concerns the financial assets and 
liabilities of the parties including earnings, gifts, debts and 
expenses as they related to the family and including the children. 
The court received abundant testimony concerning the income and 
assets of the parties. (Record 422, 425, 442, 466, 470-71, 
485-89, 589, 597). The plaintiff argues in essence that because 
the defendant's parents have been generous to their 
grandchildren, and to the parties themselves, during the marriage 
that the plaintiff should therefore have his support obligations 
reduced. (Brief p. 36-38). Plaintiff's interpretation of U.C.A. 
Section 78-45-7(2) would improperly impute the wealth of the 
defendant's parents to the defendant in analyzing the relative 
financial status of the parties. 
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The financial position of the defendant's parents is 
not relevant in determining child support and the court below 
properly limited his evaluation of the circumstanes to the parties 
themselves. Spector v, Spector, 496 P.2d 864,-(Ariz, App. 1972); 
see also Dickens v. Dickens, 187 P.2d 91, 94-95 (Cal. App. 1947) 
(court should not consider potential support from other than 
parents unless a legal obligation exists); Fine v. Fine, 173 P.2d 
355, 358 (Cal. App. 1946) (aid from relatives should not reduce 
father's support obligation). Apparently, Utah courts have not 
directly addressed that issue, but the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
rejected a husband's argument that his support award should be 
lowered because the wife's parents had substantial resources. 
The court held: 
With respect to the appellant-s suggestion that 
the wife's parents should support the child 
because they are wealthy we need only say that 
we are amazed that such a suggestion could 
seriously be made. 
Halcomb v. Halcomb, 337 S.W.2d 32, 33 (Kentucky 1960). 
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court "placed the 
plaintiff in a position where his expenses exceed his income." 
(Brief p. 37). He complains that the court improperly valued his 
company provided car, miscalculated his tax status and income 
level. The evidence refutes the plaintiff's claims of error. 
Plaintiff's own testimony indicated that he had gross income of 
$36,490.11 in 1985, (Record 587) and in addition his employer 
provided him with a car; his projected gross income for 1966 was 
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approximately $33,592.00 including bonuses (Record 595, 591) plus 
the company car. (Record 599). Cross-examination showed that 
plaintiff's estimate of his monthly expenses of $3,191.34 (Record 
53 6) were inflated, misleading and improperly calculated. 
(Record 593-599). Plaintiff's claim of income "substantially 
less than $2,000 per month" (Brief p. 37) is absolutely false and 
the court correctly found his net after tax income to be approxi-
mately $24,000 per year. (Record 257). Plaintiff's complaint 
that the value of his company car is not "income" is a technical 
distinction without merit. Certainly, a car for plaintiff's per-
sonal use is a benefit that enhances his disposable income. The 
court received substantial evidence related to the value, costs 
and benefits of the car and its effects on plaintiff's situation. 
(Record 587-90, 599-601). The court also considered the defen-
dant's earning capacity in setting the child support award. 
(Record 330). No miscalculation occurred. 
The authorities cited by plaintiff (Brief 39-40) are 
irrelevant to the facts here. Plaintiff cites Woodward v. 
Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1983) (Brief p. 39) representing 
that it means that if the custodial parent has no need of child 
support the court should relieve the noncustodial parent of sup-
port duties. Actually, the Woodward court held that because the 
custodial parent had much higher income than the non-custodial 
parent, and because one of the emancipated children was living 
with the non-custodial parent, the custodial parent was not 
entitled to child support. Woodward has no relevance here. 
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Plaintiff also cites Graziano v. Graziano, 321 P.2d 931 
(Utah 1958) contending that where the custodial parent's family 
can provide for the children, a small support award is justified. 
(Brief 40). Graziano is factually distinguishable• There the 
husband had been drafted into the army, making very low wages, 
and could not have paid much child support regardless of the 
wife's situation. The wife in Graziano had a trust fund and 
personally owned other assets. Thus, the circumstances warranted 
a low support award. Here, plaintiff makes a substantial salary 
and is capable of supporting his children in accordance with the 
decree. Plaintiff fails to explain how ordering a father who 
makes well over $30,000 per year to pay child support of $325 per 
month per child is inequitable. 
Finally, plaintiff's argument concerning the court's 
award of alimony of $1.00 per year is frivolous. The court has 
broad discretion in deciding whether alimony is appropriate, 
Bushell v. Bushell, 649 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah 1982) and plaintiff 
does not seriously argue that the court abused its discretion. 
(Brief p. 41). 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S VALUATION 
AND DISTRIBUTION OP 
MARITAL ASSETS WAS EQUITABLE 
The plaintiff's Brief, Point VIII, claims that the trial 
court awarded the defendant 97 percent of the marital estate and 
improperly valued the assets. Plaintiff's arithmetic is inde-
cipherable and his argument fallacious. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has said the following concerning 
appellate review of property distribution in divorce cases: 
The trial court exercises broad discretion in 
adjusting the financial needs and property 
interests of the parties. The Appellant must 
show that the court's award works such mani-
fest injustice or inequity as to clearly be an 
abuse of that broad discretion. 
King v. King, 717 P.2d 715, 715-716 (Utah 1986). Plaintiff's 
Brief fails to show any abuse of discretion in the court's allo-
cation of property, and the plaintiff resorts to challenging the 
competence of the trial court and attacking the veracity of the 
defendant. 
A. Household Furnishings 
Plaintiff's Brief pages 41 and 42 claims that the court 
erred by finding that the defendant's household goods were worth 
$5,000.00 instead of $10,000.00. A review of defendant's Exhibit 
"1" shows that the defendant never valued the household goods at 
$10,000.00. Plaintiff's Brief fails to identify which paragraph 
of the Findings of Fact erroneously overvalues the household 
goods. The Findings of Fact (Record 257) paragraphs 7 (c) and 
(j) are identical to defendant's Exhibit "1" paragraphs 3 and 10. 
Thus, plaintiff's arguments are without foundation. 
Plaintiff contends that the household furnishings were 
worth approximately $31,000.00 (Brief p. 45; Record 555, Plain-
tiff's Exhibit 15). The court obviously weighed the assertions 
of both parties (Record 412, 555-57) but did not accept plain-
tiff's valuation completely. The trial judge is in the advan-
taged position of hearing the testimony before he finds facts, 
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and his findings should not be reversed simply because he did 
accept plaintiff's valuations. Crofts v. Crofts, 445 P.2d 701, 
702 (Utah 1968). 
B. Clothing. 
Plaintiff's Brief (p. 42) also complains that the court 
erred by assigning no value to defendant's clothing. Plaintiff 
fails to note that his clothing was also found to be of no value. 
(Findings of Fact ]\ 7(1); Record 258). Plaintiff admitted that 
he owns clothes (Record 344), but does not complain that the 
court found his clothes to be worthless. Obviously, the court 
felt that because neither party owned valuable jewelry (Record 
504) determining a value for used clothing would be unnecessary. 
Plaintiff cannot seriously argue that awarding the parties their 
respective clothing was inequitable. Moreover, plaintiff failed 
to produce evidence showing that there was a great disparity of 
value between his clothing and the defendant's. The court's 
finding was sound. 
C. Valuation of the Rental Property. 
The parties owned two houses. Their marital residence 
(7389 South 1710 East, Salt Lake City, Utah) and the "rental 
property" (7238 South 1710 East, Salt Lake City) which the par-
ties occupied before the purchase of the primary home. (Record 
471). The court awarded the rental property to the plaintiff and 
the marital residence to the defendant, both subject to existing 
encumbrances. (Record 244, 246). Plaintiff argues that the 
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trial court undervalued the marital residence, overvalued the 
rental property and undervalued the liens on the rental property. 
The record shows conflicting testimony on each of these issues 
which the court analyzed before rendering its decree. 
The value of the residences was not determined by an 
appraisal. (Record 413, 472, 603). Instead, both parties esti-
mated the market values of the houses, with the defendant's 
valuation of the marital property being the purchase price. 
(Record 413). The plaintiff estimated that the residence was 
worth $150,000.00. (Record 546). Defendant's Exhibit 1 clearly 
shows that the defendant disputed the plaintiff's guess that the 
residence was worth $150,000.00. In addition, plaintiff's claim 
that the court erred by not finding that the house increased in 
value because of improvements (Brief p. 42-43) is nothing more 
than unsupported opinion of counsel. Plaintiff cites nothing in 
the record indicating that improvements made to the residence 
translated dollar for dollar into enhanced market value. 
Plaintiff could have obtained a professional appraisal if he had 
desired to support his valuation. (Record 603). He did not, and 
the court's finding was not an abuse of discretion. 
The plaintiff claims that the court erred by valuing the 
rental property at $79,000.00 (Brief p. 43; Record 257, Findings 
of Fact 11 7 (b) ) . Here again both parties were guessing at the 
property values because no professional appraisal had been con-
ducted. (Record 471, 603). The defendant testified that the 
parties had placed the rental property for sale with an asking 
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price of approximately $84,500.00, but that she was unsure of its 
market value. (Record 472, 743). Plaintiff puts great stock in 
a purchase offer of $73,500.00 that the parties did not accept. 
(Brief pp. 43-44; Record 552). An unaccepted purchase offer is 
certainly not incontrovertible evidence of market value, and 
given the conflicting statement concerning property valuation the 
court did not abuse its discretion in valuing the house at 
$79,000.00. 
Another error alleged by the defendant is the court's 
finding with respect to the encumbrances on the rental property. 
(Brief p. 44). The plaintiff asserts that the court's Findings 
of Fact paragraph 7(b) erroneously omitted an encumbrance of 
$2 5,000.00 on the rental property owed to Al and Justine Porter, 
the defendant's parents. (Brief p. 44; Record 554). However, 
plaintiff admitted at trial that the Porter's $25,000 "encum-
brance" had been released. (Record 553). In addition, the 
decree of divorce provides that the plaintiff is to receive the 
rental property free of all liens except the existing mortgage 
(Record 244; Judgment and Decree of Divorce ]\ 6(a)). 
The $25,000 "encumbrance" that the plaintiff alluded to 
(Record 553) arises from the purchase of the marital residence. 
(See Plaintiff's Exhibit 9-p, marked but apparently not received 
into the record). The contract required the parties to pay Al 
and Justine Porter $25,000 when the rental property was sold. 
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Because that obligation was tied to the purchase of the marital 
residence, the defendant assumed the $25,000 obligation when she 
was awarded the marital residence. (Decree ]\ 9; Record 247). 
Defendant is obligated to take actions to effectuate the court's 
decree, (Record 249) and because plaintiff is not responsible for 
the $25,000 obligation to the Porters, the court's valuation was 
proper. Finally, the defendant promised during the hearing on 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial that any questions concerning 
obligations to the Porters would be resolved by a quit-claim deed 
from the Porters. (Record 362). Thus, plaintiff's arguments are 
without merit. 
The plaintiff also claims error concerning the court's 
finding that the mortgage debt in the rental property was $44,000 
rather than $48,000 alleged by the plaintiff. (Brief p. 44). 
Defendant's Exhibit 1 was entered into evidence listing the 
mortgage as $44,000—in direct conflict with plaintiff's testi-
mony. (Record 553) . Here again the trial court was able to con-
sider the conflicting evidence and assess the credibility of the 
parties. See Crofts v. Crofts, supra, 445 P«2d 701, 702 (Utah 
1968). Plaintiff admitted that the $48,000 figure he used was 
the balance at the end of 1985, which is a few months earlier 
than defendant's financial statement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1). 
The trial court's findings carry a presumption of validity Gill 
v. Gill, 718 P.2d 779, 780 (Utah 1986), and the plaintiff failed 
to enter evidence that would justify disturbing the court's 
finding. 
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D. Employee Savings Plan. 
The plaintiff also claims that the court overvalued the 
savings plan provided through his employer. (Brief p. 44). The 
court found plaintiff's benefits to be worth $9,466 (Findings of 
Fact 1| 7(i); Record 258), but plaintiff claims his benefits were 
worth only $4,019.20. (Brief p. 44). Defendant's Exhibit 16-D 
(a summary of savings accounts provided by plaintiff's employer) 
lists Eddie Ebbert's vested rights as $9,466.31. Plaintiff was 
incapable of formulating a plausable rebuttal to the values 
disclosed in Exhibit 16-D. (Record 602). Plaintiff's argument 
that Exhibit 17-D showed that the plaintiff's vested rights were 
worth only $4,019.20 is meritless. Exhibit 17-D refers to what 
the plaintiff's remaining vested rights would be after a 
withdrawal effective December 31, 1985. The trial court was well 
within its discretion in assigning a value to plaintiff's savings 
benefits in light of Exhibit 16-D. In any event, plaintiff cites 
no evidence in the record that effectively refuted the clear 
message of the savings plan summary—that plaintiff had $9,4 66.31 
in present vested rights as of September 30, 1985. 
E. Lack of Candor. 
Plaintiff also attempts to discredit the trial court's 
findings because the court apparently trusted the defendant's 
testimony in formulating the decree. Plaintiff's brief states: 
"The Appellant demonstrated that the Respondent's testimony 
lacked credibility." (Brief p. 45). 
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The record shows that throughout the proceedings the 
defendant was forthright, and that subjects about which she was 
unsure, she openly admitted. (See for example, Record 47 3, 422). 
By contrast, the trial court explicitly stated that the plain-
tiff's testimony lacked credibility. The Court said: 
Apparently, Mr. Ebbert, you have this over-
whelming need to find out what the judge is 
thinking. Well, I'm going to tell you what 
the judge is thinking. 
...Now, what that indicates to me is—what it 
indicates to me and the conclusion to me is 
inescapable, and the conclusion is, is that 
you have demonstrated a lack of candor with 
this court. 
(Record 362-63). 
Thus, the party with a credibility problem was not the defendant. 
F. Division of the Assets 
Plaintiff's last assault on the financial aspects of the 
decree is that it does not evenly divide the assets betewen the 
parties. (Brief p. 47). No explanation is given supporting 
plaintiff's assertion that the defendant received 97 percent of 
the assets. The Findings of Fact totally undermine plaintiff's 
creative arithmetic. Even assuming the defendant did receive 
more than 50 percent of the marital assets this does not mean the 
court abused its discretion in dividing the property. 
Marital property does not have to be divided equally. 
The district court is to look at all the circumstances in making 
the division. "In the distribution of the marital estate there 
is no fixed rule or formula." Burham v. Burham, 716 P.2d 781, 
782 (Utah 1986). Here, plaintiff received a house with an existing 
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mortgage as did the defendant. He retained his employment 
retirement benefits accumulated during marriage, and he was 
required to pay temporary alimony of one dollar per year for two 
years despite the fact that his income is well over $30,000.00 
per year plus a company car. (Record 587). The parties received 
from the defendant's parents during the marriage, substantial 
gifts, valued at over $93,000.00, (Record 414, defendant's exhi-
bit 2) and the court stated that the overwhelming majority of the 
assets accumulated by the parties were given to them by defendant's 
parents. (Record 329) . The court found that the parties had 
approximately $103,900.00 in assets and $10,000.00 in liabilities 
for a net worth of $93,700.00. (Record 259). The plaintiff 
received approximately $42,500.00 of the net worth — certainly 
an equitable proportion of the marital estate. Defendant received 
approximately $49,650.00 of the net worth, which is also a reason-
able amount in light of the facts. Plaintiff is the beneficiary 
of defendant's parents' generosity. He leaves the marriage 
owning a house that became the "rental property" only because the 
defendant's parents essentially purchased the "marital residence" 
for the parties. (Record 471, 414-15). Considering these cir-
cumstances, the court's division was reasonable and equitable. 
IV. 
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD HOT BE 
AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES 
FOR BRINGING THIS APPEAL 
Plaintiff's final contention is that he should be 
awarded his attorney's fees in bringing this appeal. (Brief p. 
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48)• The plaintiff commenced the divorce proceedings and brought 
this appeal. (Record 2, 289). The trial court held that each 
party should bear his or her attorney's fees below, and the 
plaintiff has failed to justify why that reasoning should be 
changed on appeal. 
Plaintiff cites Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 
1983) in support of his argument that defendant should be saddled 
with plaintiff's costs on appeal because she is "relatively more 
able to pay" them. (Brief p. 48) . In Salvage the Supreme Court 
upheld an award of attorney's fees to a wife who was unemployed 
where the husband earned $133,370 per year and the wife's only 
income was $7,000 in stock benefits. The facts here do not 
approach Savage, and plaintiff's request is without merit. 
CONCLDSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in rendering judgment below. To the 
contrary, the court's decree evidences fairness, reasonableness 
and practicality. Therefore, the decree should be upheld. 
Plaintiff's affidavits filed with this Court are improper and 
should not be considered. 
DATED this 1/& day of June, 1987. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
JAMES P. COWLEY 
• JJIUJIAM H. CHRISTENSI 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever penod may 
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by 
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense as-
serted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence set fortlvur attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supple-
mented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is 
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall 
so order, specifying the time therefor. 
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UTAH CODE ANNO l"A VIA) 
30-3-5, Disposition of property Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children — Court to have con-
tinuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — 
Termination of alimony Nonmeritorious peti-
tion for modification. 
11 When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equita-
ble ordera relating to the children, property and parties The court ihall 
include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children, and 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the dependent children 
12) The court mayr include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial pareni 
<3) The court ha,3 continuing i I rtion to m4ke subsequent changes or 
new orders for fhe support md nil IU nance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental i are r ihe iin-
tnbution of the property as is reasonable and necessary. 
4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and i 11 er 
relatives, the court shall consider the welfare of the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order ot 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termi-
nates upon the remarriage of that former apouse However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
the party paying alimony is made a party to the acttion of annulment and his 
rights are determined. 
6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that t^ iat relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
* 7) When a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions 
of a court order is made and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pn i 
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, 
if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted in 
good faith. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Assess-
ment formula for temporary support 
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by pnor 
court order unless there haa been a material change of circumstance on the 
part of the obligor or obligee. 
(2) When no pnor court order exists, or a material change in circum-
stances has occurred, the court m determining the amount of prospective 
support, shall consider all relevant factors including but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support of others. 
(3) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and as-
sess all arrearages based upon, but not limited to: 
(a) the amount of public assistance received by the obligee, if any; 
(b) the funds that have been reasonably and necessanly expended in 
support of spouse and children. 
(4) In determining the amount of prospective support on an ex parte or 
other motion for temporary support, the court shall use a uniform statewide 
assessment formula, adjusted for regional differences, pnor to rendenng 
the support order. The formula shall provide for all relevant factors which 
can be readily identified and shall allow for reasonable deductions from the 
obligor's earnings for taxes, work related expenses, and living expenses. 
The assessment formula shall be established by the Department of Social 
Services and penodically reviewed by the Judicial Council under Subsec-
tion 78-3-21(3). 
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